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ABSTRACT This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional
subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically
think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is
paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy.
Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our
initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel phi-
losophical account of self-deception. The account offered is independently plausible and
avoids the main problems that plague other views. It also yields the result that some delu-
sional subjects are self-deceived. The conclusion is not, however, that those subjects are
blameworthy. Rather, a distinction is made between blameworthiness and ‘attributability’.
States or actions can be signiﬁcantly attributable to a subject—in the sense that they are
expressions of their wills—without it being the case that the subject is blameworthy, if the
subject has an appropriate excuse. Understanding delusions within this framework of
responsibility and excuses not only illuminates the ways in which the processes of delusional
belief formation and maintenance are continuous with ‘ordinary’ processes of belief formation
and maintenance, it also provides a way of understanding the innocence of the delusional
subject that does not involve the denial of agency.
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Introduction
In this paper I intend to raise a somewhat uncomfortablequestion: are at least some delusional subjects responsible fortheir delusions? The question strikes us as uncomfortable at
least in part because we think the answer is just pretty clearly ‘no’.
Nevertheless, I will argue that at least some delusional subjects are
responsible for their delusions. My argument will be as follows:
When we consider the dynamics of a related phenomenon—to
wit, self-deception—we will see that there is enough overlap
between them to ground the judgment that self-deception is
implicated in the formation and maintenance of at least some
delusions. In order to show this, I will ﬁrst offer my own account
of self-deception. We typically think self-deceivers are respon-
sible, and my account captures the sense in which this is correct. I
then argue that, according to my account, at least some delusional
subjects are self-deceived. Importantly, I believe that this can be
shown to be the case without leading us to the judgment that
delusional subjects are blameworthy for their delusions. In order
to thread this line, I will appeal to the distinction between what I
will call ‘attributability’ (roughly1 following Shoemaker (2011)
and Watson (2004b)) and blameworthiness. I will argue that
while self-deceivers are typically responsible both in the sense that
their self-deception is attributable to them and in the sense that
they are blameworthy, delusional subjects, even when they are
self-deceived, are typically only responsible in the sense that their
delusions are attributable to them. Why this should be so will be
made clear by consideration of the details of my own view of self-
deception, as well as the details of the delusions which I consider.
A little bit more about the signiﬁcance of our question: lying
behind the seemingly ordinary idea that delusional subjects are
not responsible is the idea that delusions are somehow beyond the
scope of ordinary interpersonal understanding. Karl Jaspers
(Jaspers, 2007, pp 174–175) famously distinguished this kind of
understanding from what he called ‘explanation’. Jaspers was
aware that psychiatry was partly a natural science, and partly a
human science. Explanation is what natural science does: it uses
objective empirical methods to elucidate causal structures.
Understanding, on the other hand, is unique to human science,
and uses ordinary interpersonal imagination and other ‘sub-
jective’ methods to appreciate the experiences of subjects ‘from
the inside’ (Kendler and Campbell, 2014, p 1). Jaspers never-
theless found that understanding could sometimes break down in
the face of more extreme symptoms. The prevailing ethic in
contemporary medical psychology seems to agree with him. The
idea is to regard patients suffering extreme symptoms as deser-
ving of compassionate treatment, but also as nevertheless, at some
ultimate level, perhaps beyond understanding—or as Jaspers
himself put it, ‘un-understandable’. I will not (and cannot) argue
that understanding does not break down in the face of some
extreme conditions, but it is my view that we should push the
boundaries of such understanding as far as they can go in the
hopes of coming to grips with how best to understand, in
ordinary humanistic terms, what is going on in certain forms of
mental illness. I will return to some of the consequences of my
argument for the understandability of delusions below
under 'Responsibility and delusion'.
So, the uncomfortable nature of our question belies a com-
mitment to extending ordinary human understanding—and
indeed, the boundaries of the moral community—as inclusively as
we can. For non-experts, our understanding of delusions depends
on a highly elaborated medical practice to which we are largely
outsiders. And I wish to take seriously the critical idea that
practices such as institutionalized medicine and the knowledge
which they enable often conceal dynamics of unequal power
(Foucault, 1969).2 This behooves us to be sensitive to the tacitly
normative aspects of the explanatory categories appealed to by
such practices (categories such as delusional), and the effects that
such categorization may have on those who are subject to it.
Whether someone who is suffering from delusions is—and
whether it is appropriate eo ipso that they should be made to feel
like—a non-agent, a passive sufferer, or someone who is generally
non-responsible, are philosophical questions, and answers to
them should not be implicitly imported along with the very idea
of a delusion. This discussion is an attempt to provide a philo-
sophically sound way of broaching these questions, and to temper
the temptation to give too-easy answers to them.
So, I think our question is important. As I said, to go about
answering it, I will argue that there is overlap between delusion
and self-deception. More precisely, I will argue self-deception can
play a role in the formation and maintenance of delusions. But as
I said (and I hope to be able to illuminate why this ought to be so)
we typically judge self-deceivers responsible for their self-
deception. We are also, as I said, pulled towards the claim that
delusional subjects are not responsible for their delusions. Taken
together with the thesis that I want to argue for, this suggests the
following triad:
1. Delusional subjects are not responsible for their delusions
2. Self-deceived subjects are responsible for being self-deceived
3. There is overlap between self-deception and delusion
If (1) and (2) are read as generics (and they certainly should
not be read as universal generalizations), then the triad is not,
strictly-speaking, inconsistent. But it points to the need to say
something about how we should think of the identiﬁed cases of
overlap with respect to responsibility. Are they, in this respect,
more self-deception-like or more like typical delusions? I hope to
be able to make clear, by way of appeal to my account of self-
deception, why we should go for the former and not the latter.
With that in mind, let us turn to my account of self-deception.
Self-deception as omission
Amongst philosophers there is still a lively debate going on
concerning the correct analysis of self-deception, and I will not be
able to settle that debate here. But I do have a view to offer (which
I develop more extensively elsewhere). To begin, let’s consider an
example:3
A: A is an academic who is self-deceived about the quality
of his own work. A is unhesitant about advertising what he
takes to be his own brilliance to others, but it is clear to his
colleagues and everyone familiar with his work that the
work is ﬂimsy. Nonetheless, A badgers OUP to put out a
volume of his collected papers. He avoids situations where
he might have to confront his work’s obvious shortcomings,
and when he does encounter criticism he dismisses it as
jealous or vindictive. It is clear that A longs deeply for the
respect and admiration of his colleagues, but it is equally
clear that his pursuit of it is self-undermining.
What is the right way to describe what is going on with A? A
natural place to begin, and the view which most philosophical
debate about self-deception takes as a starting point, is to think of
self-deception as the intrapersonal analogue of ordinary other-
deception. I’ve called this view ‘the naïve view’:
The naïve view of self-deception: A is self-deceived that p just in
case A believes that not-p and A has acted intentionally so as to
cause A to believe p
According to the naïve view, A believes that his work is ﬂimsy,
and he has somehow managed to act so as to cause himself, on
that basis, to come to believe that his work is not ﬂimsy. There is
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a way in which this captures the phenomenon. A seems to believe
both things, and the more comforting belief seems to be a
defensive response to the more sobering one. But there’s a big
problem. How could someone ever manage to do what the naïve
view describes successfully? How is an agent to act intentionally
so as to get herself to have a belief when she also already believes
that very belief to be false? Even moderate doxastic voluntarists
would admit that an agent cannot come to believe anything at all
just at will, and it seems if anything constrains what one is able to
believe at will, it is precisely what else one knowingly believes.
Even if there is no other obstacle to my coming to believe that it is
raining, the fact that I already believe, and am going to continue
to believe, that it is not raining, and that I know this about myself,
seems more than enough to prevent me from believing that it is
raining. There seems to be three moving parts to the problem:
belief, intentional action, and psychological unity. If the self-
deceived agent could somehow pull off an intentional act of
getting himself to believe what he also believes to be false, would
this not undermine his psychological unity? This seems like a
process which the agent’s psychological unity would sufﬁce to
prevent. If what the self-deceived sufﬁciently uniﬁed agent
manages to bring about in himself is a genuine belief, would
he not have to have done it non-intentionally? Mutatis mutandis,
if the sufﬁciently uniﬁed self-deceived agent really intends to
deceive himself, how can the deception involve the bringing about
of a genuine belief?
Philosophers have dealt with this so-called ‘dynamical’ pro-
blem of self-deception in different ways. Some have downgraded
the self-deceptive act from fully intentional to something less than
that (Mele, 1997); others have downgraded the self-deceptive state
from fully doxastic to something than that (D’Cruz, In prep.;
Gendler, 2007; Darwall, 1988); still others have thought it would
sufﬁce to give up on a certain degree of psychological unity
(Davidson, 2004; Pears, 1984).
All of these approaches have their advantages and dis-
advantages. For most views on offer, the problem is quite simply
that they do not adequately address the dynamical problem. The
scope of the present inquiry forbids going into all the details, but
this is worth illustrating, so let’s consider one such view.
One particularly popular strategy has it that self-deception is a
kind of pretense. I will focus on Stephen Darwall’s (1988) version
of the view, but Tamar Gendler (2007) has also proposed a
similar view, and Jason D’Cruz (In prep.) has a revision of
Gendler’s view. According to the self-deception-as-pretense view,
when one is self-deceived about p one need not believe it
(although one does typically believe its negation). Rather, one is
engaged in an elaborate pretense according to which p is the case.
One acts as if p were true. But unlike in ordinary pretense, where
one also believes that one is engaged in pretense, when one is self-
deceived, one is also engaged in a second-order pretense about
one’s ﬁrst-order pretense: one behaves as if one is not merely
behaving as if p.
Darwall claims that the self-deceived agent need not literally
believe the thing that he is supposedly self-deceived about. Per-
haps he just thinks various thoughts that amount to a kind of
elaborate pretense to the effect that the thing in question is the
case. But, in ordinary cases of pretense, we know that we are
pretending. So, in order for the pretense to have the desired
psychological results (preservation of self-image, successfully
avoiding facing up to painful realizations, etc.) it seems that the
nature of the pretense itself has to be concealed. As Darwall puts
it, ‘[This is] not simply the ﬁrst-order pretense involved in fan-
tasy, but also the second-order pretense that…pretensions are
real. When the self-deceiver plays the role of fool to himself, he
must also pretend that he is not playing that role’ (1988, pp
414–415).
I take it that the reason that the second-order pretense is
necessary is to conceal from the self-deceiver the fact that he is
engaged in pretense. But now we have to face squarely the
question of how someone could ever manage to get himself into
that state in the ﬁrst place. And further, the purpose of engaging
in the pretense must not be simply to sharpen theatrical skills or
for merry diversion. Plausibly the purpose is something self-
directed and psychological such as, again, the preservation of self-
image, or to avoid facing up to some painful facts. But this is the
sort of thing that just cannot be achieved by pretense if one
knows that one is pretending. So the purpose of engaging in the
pretense, whatever it is precisely, will often be something which
cannot be achieved unless it is hidden from the agent.
But if the reason for engaging in the second-order pretense is
to make the ﬁrst-order pretense more credible—i.e., to conceal it
as pretense—how are we to make sense of the act of engaging in
that second-order pretense without attributing to the agent the
very knowledge that would undermine its aim? It seems that the
agent must intend to get himself into the state of engaging in both
pretenses for the sake of achieving a psychological end, but he
must somehow manage to do this without revealing to himself
that this is what he is doing. If the problem with intentionally
trying to acquire a belief that one also believes to be false has to
do with the fact that (acquiring this kind of) belief is not under
control of the will, the problem here is that what one is able to
conceal from oneself about what one is doing is not under control
of the will either. For that matter, why would second-order pre-
tense do the trick, even if we could pull it off? Would we not need
third order pretense, and so on, indeﬁnitely?
This is merely illustrative, but some of the difﬁculties there are
generalizable to other views and I take the difﬁculties to be serious
enough to warrant a different approach. According to my own
view, there is no single act which is the act of self-deception. This
is because, on my view, it is not always crucial to self-deception
how the self-deceptive belief comes about. Often what is crucial is
how that belief is maintained. My view says:
Self-deception as omission: An agent is self-deceived that p if
she believes p and intentionally omits to seek, recognize, or
appreciate externally available evidence for not-p, for reasons
which ultimately relate to her desire that p be true, in a way which
enables the maintenance of the belief that p.4
By severing the connection between some distinctively self-
deceptive process of belief formation, and the resulting self-
deceptive state, we can avoid the dynamical problem. My view
also captures—as some others do not—the sense in which self-
deceivers are responsible: it describes a distinctive kind of moti-
vated epistemic failure which (as we will see shortly) can be
grounds for at least a couple of varieties of responsibility
judgments.
My view also captures what is going on with A. From the
vignette we have seen, we do not know how A came to his belief
about the quality of his work, but on my view that does not much
matter. A’s belief in the quality of his work may have been well-
founded at one point. Perhaps he used to be a big ﬁsh in a small
pond, outperforming other undergraduates at the small state
school where he studied, but as he advanced through his career
the abilities of those he was surrounded by rose consistently,
while his remained stagnant. Or maybe he was never really cut
out for academic work and his belief was formed directly and
unconsciously as a way of dealing with the stresses of academic
life. According to Self-deception as Omission, it does not much
matter. What matters is that now the belief is manifestly defeated
by evidence which is readily available, but A is impervious to that
evidence because he prefers to continue to believe as he does—
that is, he has a desire that p be true—and this motivates him to
forswear looking into the matter any further. This is why he
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avoids confrontations with others in his ﬁeld. He omits to do
whatever it is precisely that the epistemic norms say that he ought
to do in order to bring his belief into proper conformity with the
evidence.
What does it mean for the agent’s reasons for omitting to seek,
recognize, or appreciate evidence to relate to her desire that p be
true? I will say that a subject is emotionally entangled with a pro-
position p if she is liable to satisfaction or dissatisfaction when p is
believed to be true or false. To desire that p be true is for satisfaction
to accompany the belief in p and dissatisfaction the belief in not-p
(as opposed to the other way around). Of course, the belief that p
does not formally satisfy the desire that p be true. Rather, the formal
object of that desire is the truth of p itself. So the satisfaction and
dissatisfaction in question for emotional entanglement is not for-
mal, nor is it experiential.5 It is, we could say, representational. It is
the kind of satisfaction or dissatisfaction that obtains when the
subject’s take on the way the world is more or less closely
approximates the way the subject thinks the world ought to be. This
is obviously a matter with motivational efﬁcacy, but it can be so
without having a readily identiﬁable experiential component.
There is admittedly something metaphorical in talk of entan-
glement, but this expression captures something about the way in
which the interaction between, and layering of, desires can pro-
duce a complicated web-like structure. There are many ways in
which I may desire the truth of some proposition. I might desire it
to be true for its own sake (such as I might desire to have a good
relationship with someone); I might desire it to be true for the sake
of something else (such as I might desire my car to function well);
I might desire that something be case rather than something else
(such as I might desire my partner’s inﬁdelity as an explanation
for her growing distance over my own emotional unavailability).
These are all things I can be self-deceived about because they
are things in the truth of which I can manifest an emotional
interest.6, 7
My view departs from the naïve view in one very crucial way by
ﬁnding what is distinctive about self-deception, not in the process
of belief formation, but in the dynamics of belief maintenance. It
is usually taken for granted in the self-deception literature that
nothing should count as a self-deceptive state that does not arise
from some distinctively self-deceptive process, that there is a
constitutive connection between self-deception as a process, and
self-deception as the product of that process. Call this thesis the
constitutive connection thesis. Now, if the constitutive connection
thesis is true, it is clear what the object of philosophical analysis
ought to be: If what makes something self-deception is how it
comes about, we had better ﬁgure out how it comes about. Of
course, there is a trivial reading on which the constitutive con-
nection thesis is true: every particular that comes about as the
result of a process is constitutively connected with that process.
You do not get goulash by baking pie. However, with self-
deception, the connection between process and product is
thought to be more intimate than that. The fact that some process
was a process of deceiving oneself confers on the resulting state
the status of self-deception. Suppose that state is a belief. There
are lots of ways to get a belief, many of which are epistemically
respectable. Only one way (or some privileged set of ways) of
getting that belief is a self-deceptive way. Even though whatever
way the goulash comes about will trivially be a goulash-making
process, it does not much seem to matter (purist intuitions about
goulash with science-ﬁction pedigree notwithstanding) from the
standpoint of assessing whether something is goulash which
particular process resulted in it. This does not seem to be true for
self-deception. Or so the thought goes.
My view involves the denial of the constitutive connection
thesis. The way I wish to cash this out it is to appeal somewhat
more perspicuously to the distinction between belief formation
and belief maintenance. We ought not to think that a perfectly
clear temporal line can be drawn to distinguish between processes
of belief formation and processes of belief maintenance: When is
the belief formation process over, and when does the process of
belief maintenance begin? I will say that a process (or part of a
process)8 is one of belief formation if the belief counterfactually
depends on it for the agent’s credence in it to increase; and that a
process is one of belief maintenance if the belief counterfactually
depends on it for the agent’s credence in it not to decrease.9 On
this way of thinking about it, some processes will (relative to a
given belief) clearly be processes of belief formation (such as, with
respect to the belief that it is raining, the perceptual experience of
seeing the rain outside my window); others will clearly be pro-
cesses of belief maintenance (such as, with respect to the belief
that it is raining, not encountering any evidence to the contrary in
the meantime); and a great deal will be both (such as, looking
again and seeing that it is still raining, as opposed to seeing that it
is not).
As I suggested could be the case with A, I think there are cases
of self-deception where one initially had good evidence for what
one believes, but where the evidential situation has since changed,
and this change has gone unnoticed for some motivationally
biased reasons. To give another example, suppose I believe that I
am popular with the kids at school. Maybe I was popular with the
kids, but kids are ﬁckle, and they have since turned on me. It
seems to me that I might be self-deceived if the reason that I
continue to believe as I do is because I am impervious to the
manifestly available evidence on account of my preference for
continuing to believe as I do. We can suppose that once I have
reached the point where the kids have turned on me, my credence
in the belief that I am popular is not increasing and eo ipso it does
not counterfactually depend on me doing or not doing anything
in order to increase. But my belief does counterfactually depend
on my doing something—or more precisely, not doing something
—in order for my credence not to decrease. The evidence is
manifestly there, and confronted with such evidence a rational
agent would revise her beliefs. What’s going on with me? I’m self-
deceived! I am intentionally omitting to do what is necessary to
bring my beliefs in line with the evidence.
What is the nature of this intentional omission? One might
wonder the following:10 If all the agent is doing is maintaining her
belief—especially if it is done via omission—in what way is self-
deception an intentional phenomenon? For it to be intentional,
would not the agent have to be knowingly maintaining her belief
against available evidence? Does not Self-deception as Omission
face a revised version of the dynamical problem? This worry is
actually two distinct worries, and I take them both in turn.
The ﬁrst worry is that my view would not be able to capture
what is intentional about self-deception without facing a version
of the dynamical problem. The problem is thought to arise
because for something to be self-deception, not only does some-
thing about it have to be intentional, but it seems that the vio-
lation of epistemic norms—the irrationality itself—has to be
somehow intentional. This, I take it, is what makes this worry
seem like a version of the dynamical problem.
Now, of course, belief maintenance that ﬂies in the face of
manifest evidence to the contrary cannot be fully knowing. But it
need not be in order to be fully intentional. Here I wish to make a
move which Al Mele makes in giving his account (1997) of self-
deception. Mele distinguishes, in effect, between intending
something de re and intending it de dicto. According to Mele’s
view the self-deceiver intends to do something which is an act of
deceiving herself without intending to deceive herself as such.11
This, Mele thinks, recovers what is intentional about self-decep-
tion, all the while deﬂating it to avoid the dynamical problem.12 I
think this is precisely the right move to make after we have given
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up on the constitutive connection thesis. Once we are talking
merely about belief maintenance, and not belief formation, the
imagined challenge for my view is not to give a psychologically
coherent account of some process, but rather to recover a node of
intentional agency which is also recognizably an epistemic failure.
The answer to this challenge is pretty straightforward on my view:
the agent intentionally (de re) omits to seek, recognize, or
appreciate externally available evidence for reasons that are
motivationally biased, even if she does not intend to do these
things as such. So, after it has become clear to everyone else that I
am no longer popular, I may simply do nothing by way of further
investigation into the matter and thus continue to believe as I do.
The omission may, of course, not be total. It could be that on
occasion I do encounter evidence but I omit to put it together or to
engage with it as evidence.13 So long as my lack of further effective
epistemic engagement is motivated by a desire that it be true that I
am popular, then I will be guilty of self-deception according to my
view. And of course this need not be a one-off affair. My desire
that a certain proposition be true may cause me to forego epis-
temic engagement on many separate occasions.
The second worry here has to do more directly with my appeal
to omissions. It’s not true in general that every time I omit to do
something, I do so intentionally. If someone in the next room
requires aid, but I do not know it, then it seems I do not inten-
tionally omit to aid them if I go on reading my book. But this is
precisely the sort of knowledge which is denied to self-deceivers
on pain of falling into the dynamical problem. My failure to seek,
or my failure to engage with, evidence against what I believe
cannot be motivated by knowledge that it is evidence against what
I believe. But the norms that the self-deceiver violates are, in the
ﬁrst instance, epistemic norms, whereas the norm that requires
me to render aid is a moral norm. Moral norms may fail to apply
to agents who do not have the right knowledge, assuming the
agent is not culpable for her ignorance itself—this seems to be a
version of ought-implies-can. But epistemic norms cannot be
wriggled out of in the same way, especially if they are norms that
require an agent to form a particular belief (against a background
of evidence and other beliefs). Epistemic norms say how one
ought to conform one’s beliefs to evidence, or to one’s other
beliefs, and it is no violation of ought-implies-can that the agent
not already have the target belief. If it were, then it would never be
epistemically required that anyone form any belief that they do
not already hold, no matter how strong the evidence. Ignorance
itself cannot be—at least not in the same straightforward way—
grounds for claiming that an epistemic norm does not apply as it
can be with moral norms. So, while it is plausible that some
knowledge is required for an omission to count as a violation of a
moral norm, it is not plausible in the same way for omissions
which are violations of epistemic norms.
What I want to claim next is that the self-deceiver’s motivated
epistemic failure is a form of mental agency. We interpret him as
having some motivations—wanting to believe well of himself,
wanting acclaim in the profession, and so on—and those moti-
vations underlie his failure to bring his belief into conformity
with the evidence that is available to him. The state that he thus
ends up with is, I will say, a manifestation of his will. Allow me to
elaborate this by distinguishing two different kinds of
responsibility.
What kind of responsibility?
To make the distinction I want to make, let’s consider a very
simple example. Suppose you step on my foot. Naturally, perhaps,
I may want to blame you. First things ﬁrst. First: are you a can-
didate for moral assessment? Are you a member of the moral
community towards whom attitudes like praise and blame are
ever appropriately directed? One way to get at this is to ask: Are
you a normal adult human being who can recognize and respond
to reasons for action? If you are a child, or a paramecium, or—as
we too often say—if you are insane, you do not have that capacity
and we say you are exempt (Strawson, 1962, p 3) from assessment
altogether. (Obviously there are some forms of insanity which
ground exemptions of this kind. I do not think having delusions,
on its own, is one such form. What it means to be ‘insane’ in this
sense is, in part, the topic of current discussion.)
Suppose you are the right kind of creature with the right kinds
of capacities to be a candidate for moral assessment. Still, that
does not settle the question of whether you are blameworthy. We
must now ask whether you are excused. There are at least two
varieties of excuses:14
1. Strong excuses work by undermining the agent’s ownership
of the state or action itself. If the action is not yours in the
right way you are not blameworthy for it. So, if you stepped
on my foot because you were shoved by a passerby, you are
not blameworthy because, strictly speaking, stepping on my
foot was not something that you yourself did.
2. Weak excuses block the step from an agent’s ownership of
the state or action to blameworthiness. If you have a blind
spot, and my foot happened to be in it while you were
trotting on your merry way, you are not blameworthy. But
it’s not because you are exempt, nor is it because you failed to
act. You act intentionally in stepping, and are responding to
reasons (we may suppose), and the action is yours. But, you
are not blameworthy because of your ignorance. Note that
the typical way in which this works is by demonstrating that
you did not display a malicious (or, say, negligent) quality of
will.
The distinction between exemption and the two kinds of
excuses ought to be fairly familiar from ordinary legal reasoning. I
must be indicted before charges can be brought against me in a
court (this analogous to ﬁnding that I am not exempt), and once I
am there I can plead not guilty either on account of having not in
fact done the thing in question (strong excuse), or on account of
having done it in a non-culpable way (weak excuse).15 Relevant to
this, of course, is indeed the quality of my will. Whether I am
guilty of malevolence, negligence, or excused altogether will
depend on what I believed and what I desired at the time of my
action.
We can now deﬁne two different kinds of responsibility. The
ﬁrst is:
Attributability: An action or state is attributable to an agent iff
that agent is neither exempt from the sort of assessment appro-
priate for that action or state nor strongly excused from such
assessment.
Attributability is a way of marking that at least two hurdles
have been cleared: you are not exempt, and you are not strongly
excused. If you step on my foot because of your blind spot, we can
get at least this far. Blameworthiness goes further.
Blameworthiness: An agent is blameworthy for an action or
state only if that state or action is attributable to her (she is not
exempt from assessment and is not strongly excused) and is not
weakly excused.
So, only if your action is attributable to you, and you have no
excuses that justify the performance of it, is it appropriate for me
to blame you. The kind of blameworthiness that I have in mind
here is perhaps best thought of as a kind of liability. To be
blameworthy in this sense is for a range of reactions of what we
might call ‘holding to account’ to be appropriate.16 These reac-
tions include the Strawsonian reactive attitudes, such as resent-
ment and the withholding of good will, but also things such as
demands for compensation, material or otherwise. What unites
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these reactions of holding to account is that they demand of the
offending party a response, the appropriate response to which in
turn is forgiveness. The simplest case of blaming someone in this
sense is perhaps ﬁnding them blameworthy, demanding an
apology and withholding good will until it is given. The appro-
priate response to a sincere apology is forgiveness and a repair of
relations. The compensatory nature of the demands of account-
ability which are characteristic of this kind of blame thus dis-
tinguish it from punishment, which is retributive.17
My use of the term ‘attributability’ is closely related to that of
David Shoemaker (2011) and Gary Watson (2004b). For Shoe-
maker and Watson, judgments of attributability are also grounds
for aretaic, or characterological, assessments of agents. My use of
the term is in accordance with their use in this respect. So, not
only is attributability a logically necessary condition on blame-
worthiness, it is also in its own right typically grounds for a
distinctive kind of assessment. When an agent ‘owns’ a state or
action in the right way, it is expressive of her will in the sense that
she thereby reveals to us something of her deep self: perhaps
something about her desires and motivations; her perspective on
life and on herself; or her characteristic patterns of thought,
action, and evaluation.
This can be brought out in connection with the two different
kinds of excuses. Since strong excuses work by undermining
attributability itself, we should expect that when someone is
strongly excused we ﬁnd that there are no grounds for assessing
him aretaically. And this is what we ﬁnd. If you step on my foot
because you were pushed, you do not thereby disclose yourself to
me. On the other hand, if you are merely weakly excused you
might not be an appropriate target for blame, but I may never-
theless learn that you are clumsy.18 Sometimes, in addition to
blocking the step from attributability to blameworthiness, a weak
excuse will also provide grounds for a countervailing aretaic
assessment. If I learn that you pushed me to save me from being
hit by oncoming trafﬁc, not only are you excused by demon-
strating that the quality of your will was not malicious, you show
yourself to be acting virtuously, in a way that merits praise. I will
return to this function of weak excuses below.
I hope that it is reasonably clear how, according to my view of
self-deception, self-deceivers are attributability-responsible for
their self-deception, and that they are (typically at least) also
blameworthy. The self-deceiver seems to violate an epistemic
norm, and so we can begin anew an inquiry parallel to the
questions asked when we inquired about whether you were
blameworthy for stepping on my foot. Let us consider A. A has
somehow come to the belief that his work is not ﬂimsy. But it is
manifest that this is not the case. He persists in his fantasy
nevertheless. According to my view, this is because he omits to do
what is necessary to bring his belief in line with the available
evidence because he has a desire that his work not be ﬂimsy. A is
not exempt. (In general, it seems self-deceivers are not exempt; no
creature without the capacities to be a candidate for moral
assessment generally could be the subject of self-deception.) Is A
strongly excused? Strong excuses work by showing that the action
or state did not ‘belong’ to the agent in the right way, that it was
not an expression of his will. Of course, it is possible for someone
very much like A to act, and think, and speak like A and yet to be
strongly excused. If A were being controlled remotely via a chip
implanted in his brain perhaps he would be strongly excused. But
as we are imagining him, A is engaged in a kind of fantasy which
serves an important psychological function for him (though he is
almost certainly unaware of it), and it reﬂects, on account of the
motivation which my account attributes to him, his desire that
things be a certain way, a way which they manifestly are not, and
from which he has insulated himself. He thus is the owner of his
self-deceptive omission(s), he does manifest his will in the
process, and, importantly, he discloses himself and is an appro-
priate target for aretaic assessment.
Self-deceivers often elicit judgments of frustration, pity, and
even contempt. These judgments ﬁrst get a foothold at the level of
attributability because they are appropriate responses to someone
who has displayed the qualities of character that A has, viz.,
injudiciousness, vanity, and even cowardice. The only thing
which remains to be determined is whether A might have a weak
excuse that could insulate him from blame or potentially provide
grounds for a countervailing aretaic assessment. But as far as we
can tell—and as seems to be the case for self-deceivers quite
generally—there is no excuse that A can appeal to. Weak excuses
work by showing that the agent did not manifest a malicious or
negligent quality of will, but A does manifest (at least) a negligent
quality of will. Indeed, in self-deception we see the marriage of
both epistemic and volitional defects combining to make for this
negligence.19 In willing something to be the case which is
manifestly false, A both shows the epistemic vice of injudicious-
ness and is engaged in a ﬂight from anxiety. This combination of
epistemic and volitional failures strikes me as distinctive of
motivated irrationality. Doing one’s epistemic duty often requires
a steadier will than the agent possesses, and this failure can
manifest itself, on my view, as a motivated failure to seek,
recognize, or appreciate evidence. Below I will discuss a case
where a manifestation of epistemic vice seems to be excused, but
that does not appear to be the case here. I now wish to turn to
delusions.
Background: delusions
In this section I want to introduce delusions by way of a
working deﬁnition, and by examples, many of which I will return
to as we go along. By way of a deﬁnition, the DSM–V says (APA
2013):
Delusions are ﬁxed beliefs that are not amenable to change
in light of conﬂicting evidence. Their content may include a
variety of themes (e.g., persecutory, referential, somatic,
religious, grandiose) […] Delusions are deemed bizarre if
they are clearly implausible and not understandable to
same-culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life
experience […] The distinction between a delusion and a
strongly held idea is sometimes difﬁcult to make and
depends in part on the degree of conviction with which the
belief is held despite clear or reasonable contradictory
evidence regarding its veracity.
Many parts of this deﬁnition are controversial, and it is sub-
stantially different from the DSM-IV version.20 There is plenty to
say about the deﬁnition and its relation to earlier ones but for
now it sufﬁces to note that the focus in the updated deﬁnition has
shifted to what we might call the epistemic features of delusions.
These features (ﬁxity, degree of felt conviction, persistence in the
face of clear contradictory evidence, etc.) are those that have most
puzzled philosophers.
To get an idea for the variety of possible contents for delusions,
here are some examples of (types of) delusions, individuated by
their content:21
1. Delusions of persecution: Most common content for delusion
(APA, 2000, p 299). The subject believes that his or her life is
being interfered with from outside (almost but not always
harmfully). Occurs in schizophrenia, affective psychosis, and
in organic states.
2. Capgras delusion: Subject believes that a close friend or
family member has been replaced by an impostor (Capgras
and Rebould-Lachaux, 1923). I will return to Capgras in
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below in connection with the ‘two-factor’ account (Davies,
et al. 2001) of delusion formation and maintenance.
3. Anosognosia: The denial of illness. Often follows stroke or
brain injury and involves denial of following disability, e.g.,
paralysis. Ramachandran’s (Ramachandran, 1996) patient
F.D. suffered a right hemisphere stroke causing left
hemiplegia. But F.D. claimed she could walk and clap. Can
also occur in schizophrenia, leading patients to refuse to take
medication.
4. Reverse Othello delusion: Subject believes in the ﬁdelity of his
or her romantic partner in the face of strong evidence to the
contrary. Peter Butler (2000) reports the case of B. X., who
suffered a severe head injury in a high-speed car accident.
Despite the absence of contact with his romantic partner, he
subsequently ‘developed an intense delusional belief that
[she] remained sexually faithful and continued as his lover
and life partner’ (Butler, 2000, p 86). I will discuss B. X.’s case
extensively below.
I should note just in passing that, despite the language in the
DSM (and the language I have used here), it is a matter of some
dispute amongst philosophers whether delusions should count as
doxastic states. However, in what follows I will be assuming that
delusions are best thought of as beliefs.22
Responsibility and delusion
Now that we have a working understanding of both self-
deception and delusion on the table, and a sense of how self-
deceivers are typically responsible for their self-deception on my
view, our question becomes: are some delusional subjects self-
deceived? Does self-deception play a role in forming and main-
taining at least some delusional beliefs? Here I will argue that we
should say ‘yes’. This may seem surprising not least of all because
self-deception typically concerns matters which are much more
‘garden variety’ than the bizarre contents of delusional belief,
however, not all delusions have such bizarre content, as we shall
see. And even where the content is bizarre, there is room for
motivation to be playing a role that might imply self-deception is
at work.
If my account of self-deception is correct, it seems to provide
relatively straightforward criteria for assessing whether self-
deception is implicated in delusional belief. We must only ask
whether it is true that the agent has failed to confront, for
motivationally biased reasons, manifestly available evidence that
would overturn her belief. What remains, however, are two tasks
which are not so straightforward: ﬁrst, we must try to determine
whether any actual delusions satisfy those criteria, and further, we
must determine what kind of responsibility, if any, that would
ground. Let us ﬁrst address head-on the question of whether any
delusions can be thought to ﬁt my model of self-deception. The
most plausible candidate for such a case is the Reverse Othello
delusion.23
Reverse Othello delusion. Recall Peter Butler’s patient from
before, B.X.. B.X. suffered severe head injuries in a car accident.
As a result of the crash he was left quadriplegic and unable to
speak without the use of an electronic communicator. According
to Butler, in the initial stages of his illness he expressed both
insight and ‘intense emotional response to a massive disability
and a fracturing of his interpersonal relationships’ (2000, p 87).
However, in the year following his injury, B.X. gradually devel-
oped the delusional belief that he was still in a successful romantic
relationship with his former partner (who left him following his
injuries) and even claimed that they had recently married,
occasionally claiming that he needed to leave treatment to return
home to his wife.
B.X.’s appreciation of his injuries is important. He is trying to
come to terms with the signiﬁcance of an irreversible life-
changing calamity, and seems to be doing it head-on. But there is
a limit to how much such change he can accept at once without
falling apart. Butler characterizes B.X.’s delusion as protecting
him from falling into severe depression, or as we might say,
existential collapse. For him, the ability to go on is contingent on
his believing that his former partner remains faithful to him. To
lose her, on top of all of that has already happened, would be, in
some sense approaching the literal, unbearable.
In this context it is also important to note that B.X. eventually
manages to recover from his delusion. Even when the delusion
was at its most elaborated B.X. did not experience any other
psychotic symptoms. The delusional belief seemed to dawn on
him somewhat gradually, and eventually reached its most
elaborated form in the idea that he and his former partner had
been recently married. But the delusion also gradually receded,
and he came to accept that she had no intention of returning to
him. It is as though the delusion held at bay the need to face
something that B.X. was not capable of accepting, until such time
as he was more ﬁt to do so.
Together these two things suggest that B.X. is reasons-
responsive generally. His initial sensitivity and insight into his
condition are not things that he could have displayed if he had
crossed that strange boundary that leads outside the space of
reasons altogether. And the fact that he was able to recover more
or less on his own suggests that his capacity to be sensitive to
epistemic reasons remained intact—for what else other than that
very capacity could he have used to get himself out?—even if it
suffered partial muting and redirection.
On Butler’s way of thinking of things—to which I am obviously
very sympathetic—B.X.’s belief served a protective or defensive
function. How did it serve that function? It is plausible that B.X.
needed (in some appropriate sense) to believe something which
would forge a strong sense of coherence and connection with his
pre-injury self. As Butler suggests, the primary challenge for B.X.
during his recovery was coming to terms with how dramatically
and irreversibly changed his life had become. Believing that his
partner was there, that a dear corner of his otherwise
unrecognizably marred life remained as before, could plausibly
offer him something to hang on to, some piece of his past life to
use as a ﬂotation device while he tries to get himself to shore.
Now, according to my view of self-deception, it seems that B.X.
counts as self-deceived. The belief that his partner had not left
him made its appearance sometime after the period of insight that
Butler describes. This suggests that B.X. had the belief that his
partner had indeed left him at some point prior to the onset of the
delusion. Now let us suppose that as the signiﬁcance of how his
life has been transformed dawns on him bit-by-bit B.X. develops a
need to believe that his partner had not left him. In a number of
ways such a belief is a good candidate for a life-preserver-belief
because it concerns a matter which is indeed of great personal
signiﬁcance for him but, compared to the other things of great
personal signiﬁcance to him which are manifestly in shambles it
less often and less ﬂagrantly bumps up against evidence to its
contrary which would need to be ignored in order for the belief to
persist.
It seems that if B.X. is to persist in his life-preserver belief he
will need to avoid confronting evidence which points to its falsity.
His case is an interesting one because presumably the evidence
which is available concerning the falsity of that belief is given by
his memory and the memories of his caretakers. Compared to the
body of evidence that would have to be ignored if he were to, say,
try to deny his injuries (as some delusional patients do), this body
of evidence is quite sparse. A little bit of motivated failure to
consult that part of one’s memory might be all that would be
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required. If this is what happened, then B.X. counts as self-
deceived according to my view. His belief, however it was formed
precisely, is false, and manifestly so. But he manages to persist in
believing for a time (as long as he needed to, it seems) and this
seems to require making himself somehow impervious to the
evidence which he had previously appreciated.
The possible complicity of his caretakers in facilitating his
failure to confront or appreciate evidence against his delusional
belief is another interesting feature of B.X.’s case. It is also quite
readily understandable. Clinicians often have to face the difﬁcult
question of whether it is appropriate to confront a subject about
their delusional belief and many factors might go into determin-
ing the appropriate course of action. Plausibly, it would have
seemed to many clinicians that the right course of action in B.X.’s
case would be to allow him, as he seemed himself to want to do,
to take things one at a time, so to speak. If the self-deceiver is
encouraged or facilitated in their motivated omission, I am
inclined to think that it may partially mitigate his degree of
blameworthiness.
Although I do think B.X. is self-deceived on my view, I do not
think he is blameworthy. A very small part of the reason for this
might be the facilitation of his caretakers. But far more important,
it seems to me, was the function that the self-deceptive/delusional
belief was playing for B.X. at the time. If it really was (perhaps the
only thing) keeping him together, then I think we are right to see
it as an excusable trade-off between negative epistemic value and
signiﬁcant improvement to overall well-being. This does not
change the facts concerning whether B.X. in fact deceived himself,
but it is certainly relevant for determining what the appropriate
attitude is to take towards him in the light of his self-deception. I
chose to express this by saying that the self-deceptive omission,
and the resulting delusional belief are attributable to B.X., but that
he is not blameworthy for the subsequently persistent belief
because he has a weak excuse.
What of the aretaic assessment that is typically grounded by
attributability-responsibility? Is B.X. injudicious in the same way
that A is? Does he display a negligent quality of will? He may. The
moral hazards of self-deception—risk of harm to self or others,
for example—are there just as much in his case as in others. But
the weak excuse that is available in B.X.’s does more than just
block his blameworthiness. It also provides ground for counter-
balancing, or perhaps undermining, the aretaic assessment that
would normally apply.24 Excuses of this kind work as follows.
Suppose I am tasked with delivering some valuable cargo. If, on
the way down the only available path, I encounter a hairy spider
and decide to turn back, risking the cargo in the process, I am
pretty clearly guilty of cowardice. The action of ﬂeeing is
attributable to me (and is the grounds for ﬁnding me cowardly),
and so too am I blameworthy (liable) if the cargo is lost. On the
other hand, if I turn back risking the cargo because there is a
grizzly bear on the path, I do not display cowardice, but perhaps
prudence. (Or, if one prefers, I display cowardice tempered with
prudence.) For the same reason that the negative aretaic
assessment of me would seem inappropriate, I submit that I am
not blameworthy should the cargo end up lost; the very thing that
excuses me from blameworthiness also undermines or counter-
balances the judgment of cowardice. This seems to be what is
happening in B. X.’s case. His ﬂight from the truth is analogous to
my ﬂight from the bear: it comes with risks that we all recognize,
but it is not undertaken lightly or negligently. The quality of will
that he displays, against the situation in which he ﬁnds himself at
the same time makes blaming him, and ﬁnding aretaic fault,
inappropriate.
It is worth mentioning that I want to resist saying that B.X. has
a strong excuse for his self-deception. To say this would be to
deny B.X. the appropriate ownership over the strategy that he
deployed for getting through. I have spoken of his psychological
need to believe as he did, but I did not mean to suggest that his
deceiving himself was something he was literally compelled to do.
And more importantly, merely being compelled to do something
in this sense might not be enough to constitute a strong excuse. I
said that if you only stepped on my foot as a result of being
pushed, you would have a strong excuse because the action would
not be yours. What if you also, simultaneously wanted to step on
my foot? Then your action would have a cause outside of you, but
would also be an expression of your will. If we were in this
situation, we would have to do hard work to ﬁgure out which
thing should properly be considered the reason for your bodily
movement. I do not have a general procedure for coming to
answer questions of this kind, but I think it is safe to say here that
B.X. is not overdetermined in this way. It is clear that what he
does is a manifestation of his will, even if there is a sense in which
he must do it, because he wills to do as he must. This would not
be true of you if you were both shoved and malevolent; your will
was not to be shoved, even though it may have been to step on my
foot. Being compelled may not be enough to constitute a strong
excuse if one also wills the means.
Capgras; two-factor theory. While I do think that B.X counts as
self-deceived on my view, it is unclear how many other cases of
delusional belief will satisfy my account of self-deception. My aim
has certainly not been to argue that all delusional subjects are self-
deceived, or even that it is the norm. However, I think it is worth
pointing out that my approach here dovetails quite nicely with a
prominent approach in cognitive neuropsychiatry to the forma-
tion and maintenance of delusion which is called the ‘two-factor
theory’, and which I mentioned earlier in connection with Cap-
gras. This raises the possibility that motivational factors akin to
those that I think are at work in self-deception may be at work in
more cases than is widely recognized. Let me elaborate.
Recall the Capgras delusion. Someone with this delusion
believes that a friend or family member has been replaced by an
impostor. Understanding of how this delusion is formed was
greatly enhanced by the discovery that the human facial
recognition system has at least two neurologically independent
subparts. The ﬁrst, which is responsible for ‘overt’ facial
recognition is in the temporal lobe and underlies the ability to
explicitly recognize the faces of those one is familiar with. The
second, affective, system, which appears to involve the amygdala,
produces Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs)—covert recogni-
tion—when subjects are exposed to faces they are familiar with,
even if they fail to recognize the face overtly. This is what is
thought to be at work in people who have prosopagnosia.
This insight led cognitive neuropsychiatrists studying Capgras
to wonder whether the two facial recognition systems were
doubly dissociated—that is, whether each was independent of the
other and whether there could be people who had the ‘opposite’
of prosopagnosia. Such people would overtly recognize familiar
faces, but would be left without the typical accompanying
affective response. Could this be what was causing Capgras? The
patient would see his wife, and would accept that the person
before him bore an exact physical resemblance to her, but the
experience would be entirely without the ordinary feeling of
familiarity. It is, perhaps, only a small leap from there to the idea
that this person before me, while she looks exactly like my wife,
must be someone else.
The two components of the facial recognition system are now
largely thought to be doubly dissociated and the abnormal
experience of seeing someone who looks exactly like a loved one,
but who feels somehow alien, is thought to be involved in Capgras
(Ellis and Young, 1990; Ellis et al. 1997). There is, however, a
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problem. Not everyone with damage to the covert facial
recognition system develops the delusion. Even though these
patients are having the same unusual experience as the Capgras
patients, they do not form the delusion. So, something else must
be required to ﬁll in the gap between the unusual experience and
the subject eventually forming or endorsing the belief. This leaves
somewhat unsettled what the second factor must be (and there is
no consensus) but the idea that some kind of two-factor theory is
correct, at least for some delusions like Capgras, seems difﬁcult to
deny given the evidence. There must be some role for the
abnormal experience to be playing, but if that does not take us all
of the way there, there simply must be something else at work.
Many of those who pioneered the two-factor theory were
responding to an idea, tracing back to the work of Brendan
Maher beginning in the 70s,25 that delusions were largely rational
responses to highly unusual experiences (Davies, et al. 2001;
Davies, et al. 2010). Maher himself thought of his work as a direct
challenge to Jaspers’ claim that delusions were un-
understandable. If some delusions could be understood as
rational responses to a certain special kind of experience,
experience with a certain kind of force and character, then the
content of the beliefs that those experiences gave rise to could be
readily understood.
Whether this rational connection can be maintained, and what
it means for self-deception depends on how we think of the
relation between the ﬁrst and the second factor. One way of
getting at this is to ask how speciﬁc the representational content of
the abnormal experience is. For example, according to Coltheart
(2005), the Capgras patient does not experience that his wife is an
impostor; rather, an unconscious system predicts that seeing his
wife should be accompanied by a certain autonomic response
which fails to occur. He thus forms the Capgras hypothesis as an
attempt to explain the abnormal experience. According to this
‘explanationist’ account, the representational content of the
experience which prompts the delusion is less rich than the
content of the delusion itself. According to the competing
‘endorsement’ account (Bayne and Pacherie, 2004), the represen-
tational content of the experience prompting the delusion is as
rich as the content of the delusional state itself. On this kind of
account, the subject does not reach for the Capgras hypothesis as
an explanation of his experience but merely takes what is already
presented in experience to be veridical.
Obviously, whether there is room for appeal to motivational
factors (and whether such an appeal would make a given case
count as self-deception on my view), depends on which of these
competing accounts is true. On either account, motivational
factors (possibly jointly with neuropsychological factors) could be
playing a role in generating the anomalous experience. Since the
experience is much thinner on the explanationist model, it might
be thought that appeal to motivation would be otiose; still, there
could be a role for it to play. If, as some philosophers—and
increasingly many psychologists—think, it is possible for a
subject’s propositional attitudes to cognitively penetrate (Pyly-
shyn, 1999) her experience, then two subjects may have different
experiences even if we hold ﬁxed what is perceived, the perceiving
conditions, and the state of the relevant sensory organ. If this is
right, then the mere fact that one subject desires that p be the case
while the other fails to desire it or desires that not-p be the case,
might just be the difference-maker when it comes to answering
the question, ‘Why did the subject have the experience that he
had?’—even on the explanationist model.26
If motivation is playing a role in the ﬁrst factor, that will not be
enough for the sufﬁcient condition identiﬁed by Self-deception as
Omission to be satisﬁed. When we learn that the subject had
some distinctive kind of experience, we just have not learned one
way or another whether there has been motivated
mismanagement of evidence which sustains an externally
defeated belief over time. However, we may nevertheless be able
to learn something about the subject that undergoes such an
experience which is akin to what we can learn about the self-
deceiver. If we are interpreters of someone who has undergone an
experience of this kind, and we learn that this is how it has
happened, we come to learn something about the kind of
cognitive agent that the subject is.
There is also room for motivation to be playing a role in the
second factor,27and if it is present, it may go some of the way to
restoring the kind of understandability that Maher was aiming
for. On either the endorsement or the explanationist account of
things, if we have gotten this far, the Capgras belief is already in
place, either as an explanation for a bizarre experience or as one
given rise to by a bizarre experience directly. Once the belief is in
place, there is room for Self-deception as Omission to be satisﬁed.
All that would need to be the case would be for there to be a
failure of epistemic agency which is partially motivated by a
desire for the world to be as the subject already believes it to
be.28And as strange as it may sound, the operation of the second
factor seems more readily understandable when it is cashed out in
motivational terms, or indeed in terms of the kind of mental
agency that I think is at work in self-deception. The varieties of
human motivation are nearly limitless, and I do not know of any
clinical examples that bear this out, but it is not difﬁcult to
imagine someone facilitating the maintenance of the Capgras
belief for motivationally biased reasons.29 Perhaps the couple has
recently had a particularly acrimonious quarrel and it would be
somehow easier to not face the genuine article just yet; perhaps he
has been secretly yearning for a divorce and this would save him
the trouble; perhaps he has a motivation which only years of deep
analysis would uncover. Any such motivation, if it were to
underlie and facilitate the acceptance of the Capgras hypothesis,
would be grounds for thinking that we had a potential case of
self-deception here. The availability of an explanation of this kind
greatly reduces the sense that the delusion is un-understandable
by bringing the psychological dynamics of the subject into the
focus of ordinary intentional explanation.
Conclusion: innocence
I have tried to bring a number of distinctions between types of
responsibility to bear on the question with which we began. I have
also put the notion of self-deception to work in a way that I hope
has been doubly illuminating: since we have defeasible but
determinate antecedent judgments about the responsibility-status
of self-deceivers, asking whether someone’s conduct can be
assimilated to a self-deceptive paradigm can help us think about
the ways in which they may or may not be responsible. Delusions
can also help us understand the ways in which our ordinary
notion of self-deception can be extended to include, e.g., cases
where the self-deception is attributable but not blameworthy for
very good reason. Using self-deception as a tool for thinking
about some delusions also forces on us the question of what a
subject’s motivations are and this question can only be answered
by (suitably supplemented) ordinary interpersonal interpretation.
Motivations can partially constitute nodes of intentional agency
and reminding ourselves about the motivations of subjects with
delusions and the role that such motivations may play in our
assessment of them can serve as a general bulwark against slip-
ping too easily into thinking of them as outside of the scope of
ordinary assessment and understanding altogether.
It is telling that when we bring to bear the tools that I have
recommended for thinking about responsibility for delusions we
ﬁnd that there is a good case to be made that the subject is excused.
I take this to be in keeping with something Lisa Bortolotti has
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recently argued for (2015, 2016), viz., what she calls the ‘epistemic
innocence’ of some delusions. She says that a delusion is episte-
mically innocent if it confers signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁts which
could not be achieved otherwise. Bortolotti is focused on cases
where some negative epistemic consequences are embraced for the
sake of otherwise unattainable epistemic beneﬁts. I agree with
Bortolotti that the notion of epistemic innocence is of clinical and
conceptual value. What I hope to have done here is to have
introduced what might be thought of as an expansion of that
notion of innocence to cases where the negative epistemic con-
sequences are traded off against non-epistemic gains. In order to
address such cases we need conceptual tools developed from the
more general standpoint of moral theory. Taking up this stand-
point—taking seriously the possibility that assessment might here
really be appropriate—has, I hope, revealed a more comprehensive
and detailed picture of what that innocence consists in. There is a
kind of innocence which may only be possible against a backdrop
of possible guilt.
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Notes
1 But only roughly. I explain how my use of this term—and the distinction I use it to
mark—differs from Shoemaker’s below.
2 Foucault located such dynamics within what he called ‘discourses’ which are ‘ways of
constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and
power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them’
(Weedon, 1987, p 108). I do not wish to problematize the knowledge that discourses
enable (as Foucault did) but merely to draw attention to the tacitly normative aspects
of certain practices of categorization.
3 This example is adapted from Doggett (2012).
4 Note that the view is stated as a sufﬁcient condition. Because the satisfaction of this
condition can be sufﬁcient for something to count as self-deception, the constitutive
connection thesis (see below) must be false. But that is not to say that there could not
in principle be cases of self-deception which do not satisfy the condition given here. (It
would be a separate question, however, whether such cases and the view meant to
capture them would run afoul of the dynamical problem.)
5 I use the terms ‘satisfaction’ and ‘dissatisfaction’ deliberately to avoid commitment to
the idea that there must be positively or negatively valenced experiences accompanying
the subject’s belief. However, there no doubt will be cases where the subject will
experience satisfaction or believing p or will experience something like distress.
6 Theorists of self-deception disagree about what form the subject’s emotional interest
must take. For Mele (2006, 1997), for example, what it is to have an emotional interest
in p’s being true is to take the error of mistakenly believing not-p when p is in fact the
case to be more costly than the error of taking p to be the case when in fact not-p is the
case, where that preference is itself to be understood in terms of a motivational bias.
So, on this view, I might prefer to believe that I am not going bald to believing that I
am going bald because believing that I am going bald if I am not would cause me great
distress, much more than the distress that I would feel if I mistakenly believed that I
was not going bald when I was. Barnes is more explicit about self-deception’s anxiety-
reduction function. She says (1997, p 39): ‘When a person is anxious that not-q, the
person (1) is uncertain whether q or not-q and (2) desires that q’. Self-deception
reduces the person’s anxiety by resolving the question of whether q in the appropriate
direction. Although my formulation is much closer to Barnes’, as far as I can tell my
use of the idea of ‘desiring that p be true’ is consistent with both of these ways of
thinking about self-deceptive motivation. That is, having the motivated error-
preferences that Mele is pointing to is as much a matter of being emotionally entangled
(in my sense) as anxiously desiring that p be true.
7 It is also worth noting that both Barnes and Mele are keen to be able to handle cases of
‘twisted’ self-deception, i.e., cases where the subject self-deceptively believes something
he wants not to be true. My way of putting things can also handle these cases once we
distinguish between wanting something to be true in the ordinary sense and desiring it
to be true in the sense that I mean it here. A subject may desire (in my sense) for
something to be true (we may say) masochistically. That is, he may be liable to
satisfaction at believing that p where p is something that is bad for him, something he,
in the ordinary sense, does not want (or wants the opposite of). Believing that p closes
the gap between the way he takes the world to be and the way he thinks the world
ought to be, but the way that the world ought to be from his point of view is bad (say,
hedonically bad) for him.
8 I add this qualiﬁcation to avoid having to individuate processes, and will omit it from
here on.
9 Modulo, should there be such a thing, natural credence extinction.
10 I thank an anonymous referee for formulating this worry in this way to me.
11 If Mele would be willing to understand his view as including cases of culpable belief
maintenance, our views would be very closely related.
12 I am not sure that Mele succeeds in avoiding the dynamical problem, which is part of
the reason why I think we need to go further and deny the constitutive connection
thesis, that is, move to talking not about belief formation but about the dynamics of
belief maintenance. For critical discussion of Mele and the dynamical problem see
Lockie (2003).
13 There is thus an afﬁnity between my view and Fingarette’s (1969).
14 Using the term ‘excuse’ to refer to a speciﬁc variety of what Strawson (1962, p 5)
called ‘pleas’ or ‘special considerations’ is due to Watson (2004b, p 224). I take this
way of distinguishing between two types of excuses to be intuitive, however it has not,
to my knowledge, been drawn in this way and in connection with the two types of
responsibility I wish to distinguish.
15 The analogy is limited in the following way: There is difference between what is
standardly called ‘excuse’ and justiﬁcation. If an agent can produce either, she can be
shown to have avoided culpable wrongdoing. An action is justiﬁed if, all things
considered, it was not wrong. (self-defense); an agent is excused if something
undermines her responsibility (acting under hypnosis or duress). Either could be
presented as a defense against criminal charges, but weak excuses, as I intend them to
be, only comprise the latter.
16 It is worth noting, however, that whereas Shoemaker contrasts attributability with
what he calls ‘accountability’ (as well as a third notion, ‘answerability’), my
understanding of blameworthiness should not be identiﬁed with Shoemakerian
accountability. For Shoemaker, accountability has speciﬁcally do with violating
relationship-deﬁning demands (which play no role in my discussion).
17 So there ought still to be a considerable gap between someone’s being blameworthy,
and the truth of the claim that we should actually punish them. Even if someone is
found fully blameworthy for an action attributable to them it may still be a wide open
question what the right kind of response to their wrongdoing is. Indeed, it is
compatible with my way of thinking about moral responsibility that punishment is
seldom, if ever, justiﬁed or appropriate. We can see this if we imagine adopting a ﬂat-
footed consequentialist justiﬁcation for punishment. What if it turned out that
punishment was an ineffective deterrent and a poor means of personal rehabilitation?
It would not follow from this that no one’s actions were ever properly attributable to
them, nor that they were not blameworthy for those which were bad. It would simply
mean that punishment would not be the response justiﬁed by those facts. And it
seems immensely plausible to me that if anything would make punishment
inappropriate, it would be the fact that the wrongdoer already suffers great enough
misfortune that further punishment would take on a perverse character. This is just to
say that the question guiding this paper is certainly not the question of whether some
delusional subjects should be punished for their delusions.
18 Whether you are excused for being that way (or whether it is countervailed by
another aretaic assessment) is yet another question which will arise again in
connection with delusional subjects below.
19 There are some habits of mind which are epistemic vices only because they are
accompanied by indolence. For example, perhaps all of us are subject to the
availability heuristic, or liable to commit the base rate fallacy, or to manifest various
other System 1 cold biases. What separates those of us who allow the errors
characteristic of those biases to persistently take hold and those who do not is some
degree of epistemic vigilance, which is effortful. For example, consider the following
example of Kahneman’s to illustrate the System 1 at work. He says: ‘Do not try to
solve it, but listen to your intuition’ (Kahneman, 2011, p 44):
A bat and a ball cost $1.10.
The bat costs one dollar more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
The intuitive—incorrect —answer that System 1 offers up is $0.10. And it seems to
do so more or less unbidden, once the speciﬁcation of task has been grasped.
Whether one chooses to go on and perform the calculation and ultimately arrive at
the correct answer seems to be an independent matter. Without the exercise of
vigilance, one is saddled with a false belief. This is not an example of self-deception,
but it is a nice illustration of how some epistemic vices are enabled by unwillingness.
In cases where this is true, there is a foothold for various forms of assessment,
including aretaic assessment. (I leave open the question of whether there are cases of
‘pure’ cognitive bias and what kind of assessment, if any, would be appropriate
there.)
20 In particular, the requirement that the belief be false, that it be based on ‘incorrect
inference’, and that it be bizarre, have all been weakened or dropped. These ought to
strike us as welcome changes.
21 Delusions are typically differentiated by their content, but it is also widely
acknowledged that delusions are partially dependent on their cultural milieu for the
particular contents that they have (Ahmed, 1978).
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22 One reason is simple: I am very sympathetic to the idea that belief is at bottom a
concept we use to understand other agents, to explain and predict their behavior in
terms that are readily understandable to us, and generally to calibrate them in the
space of reasons. To say that someone believes p might mean things as various as (i)
they are inclined to act on p; (ii) they are inclined to report p in speech; (iii) they are
inclined to use p as a ﬁxed point in practical or theoretical reasoning; (iv) they have a
certain felt conviction in the truth of p; (v) they treat the question of whether p to be
largely settled etc. (Scanlon, 1998). So, on this way of thinking about it, belief is a kind
of syndrome with no essential features, and someone can be thought to count as
believing that p by exhibiting some number of the marks of beliefs. My sympathy
with the idea that delusions ought to count as beliefs stems largely from the
incontrovertible way in which delusional subjects satisfy, albeit in shifting and
sometimes patchy ways, these criteria. In particular, it is very difﬁcult to deny that
patients with delusions take themselves to believe the things in question. They are
subjectively experienced as ordinary beliefs and indeed, one’s degree of felt conviction
in a delusion can often greatly exceed the conviction one might experience in
ordinary belief. As Sims (2003, pp 141–142) puts it:
‘It cannot be stressed too often that patients believe their delusions literally:
subjectively, delusions are completely different from fantasy. Patients do not
describe them ‘as if’ they existed. The reality is ‘known’ with the unconcerned
certainty that the undeluded person assumes for the concrete events and ideas of
his own life, such as the ﬂoor being solid…[A] man who believed that American
battleships were sailing down the main street of Birmingham UK (100 miles
from the sea), had the reﬁned social conscience to report this to the police!’
This example is a nice illustration of how delusions may exhibit some of the marks of
belief with clarity and sharpness, even while exhibiting many of the negative
epistemic features which are characteristic of them. This subject is using his belief
that there are battleships sailing down the main street of Birmingham as the basis for
speech, inference, and indeed concern (i, ii, iii) because of his degree of felt conviction
(iv) in it. Moreover, it seems that the very fact that he takes such a thing to be a
reason for concern shows that his belief exhibits a degree of coherence with his other
beliefs, beliefs, e.g., about geopolitics and nationhood (not to mention a whole lot of
beliefs about military hardware, the nature of peacetime etc.) which together suggest
that what is happening is cause for some alarm. The belief is no doubt implausible,
and we can imagine that it exhibits a high degree of ﬁxity and resistance to
counterevidence, but that should not disqualify it from counting as belief.
23 The Reverse Othello delusion is noteworthy among delusions for not having the same
kind of bizarre content that most delusions have. It may in this respect seem tailor-
made for someone who wants to defend the claim that there is overlap between self-
deception and delusion. A critic might say: ‘Most delusions involve believing a highly
bizarre content, and it is plausible that (part of) what is distinctive about being in that
state is how the subject comes to have that attitude towards that content (perhaps,
e.g., it is caused by unusual perceptual experience.) But then there will be a gap
between self-deception and delusion, one that is missed if we focus only of belief
maintenance.’ I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue to me. My
response is twofold: First, trying to ﬁgure out how delusions are formed is surely to be
counted as one of the chief aims of the neuropsychology of delusions. And it is very
plausible that for a great many of them there will be abnormal mechanisms at work
that partially explain (among other things, perhaps) the bizarreness of the delusional
content. And this may mean that there is, in some respect, a gap between (some)
delusions and (some) self-deception. But the size of this gap, and its signiﬁcance, will
depend, in part, on what the neuropsychological abnormalities in question turn out
to be like. We can see this by considering how, when we think of the
neuropsychological abnormalities that we do know about already, it is still just a good
question the extent to which this shows there to be ‘gap’ of relevance to thinks like,
say, our responsibility judgments. When this-or-that neuropsychological abnormality
is discovered, it will still be a good question the extent to which that abnormality
presents or underlies a philosophically interesting discontinuity with ordinary
cognition, agency, autonomy, or whatever. Second, even if it turns out that the
relevant abnormalities do underlie signiﬁcant discontinuities between the delusional
and the non-delusional with respect to belief formation, it may remain true that there
is an interesting overlap between self-deception and delusion precisely because the
mechanisms of belief formation are not the only ones we must look to if we want a
comprehensive picture of the ways delusional subjects are and are not like ‘ordinary’
subjects.
24 I make this qualiﬁcation because I want to remain neutral with respect to whether the
virtues are necessarily uniﬁed.
25 Such as, e.g., Maher (1974).
26 Of course, this could also be the case on the endorsement model. Indeed, I am
assuming that the connection between what the subject desires and the content of the
experience would be easier to see on this model since the content of the experience is
identical to the content of the delusional belief. So, whenever it is plausible that the
subject could desire that the delusional belief be true, it will be plausible that the
subject desire that the content which shows up in his experience be true. (Of course,
whether cognitive penetration works this way—whether desiring that p, say,
probabiliﬁes an experience with the content that p—is an empirical matter.)
27 Davies (2010) also discusses cases where motivational factors could be playing a role
between the ﬁrst factor and the second.
28 Mele denies that self-deception obtains when the subject also suffers from a cognitive
impairment, on the grounds that the ‘causal contribution [of motivation] may be so
small’ (2006, p 123) that it should not count. I do not see why we should say that it
does not count rather than say that the contribution that it makes is gradable. And
even in cases where (as Mele has in mind) the reﬂection on the available evidence that
is prevented by motivational factors would not have caused the subject to revise his
beliefs, it seems to me that there is a characterologically relevant difference between
the agent whose reﬂection is prevented by motivational factors and the agent whose
reﬂection is not, one that we may well register by calling the former self-deceived and
not the latter. When we ask whether someone is self-deceived, we are not just asking
which factors are causally responsible for sustaining his beliefs. We are asking
whether he manifests a certain epistemic vice.
29 I was told anecdotally of a case where a patient had stopped her medication in an
attempt to manage her symptoms without the distressing side-effects that the
medication caused. After it became clear that her symptoms were unmanageable
without assistance her psychiatrist recommended, to her great dismay, that she restart
the medication, to which she responded ‘You’re not Dr. X! He would never treat me
this way!’ This suggests that there are cases of patients forming the Capgras delusion
without any underlying bizarre perceptual experience and where motivational factors
seem to be doing most of the work. Conversely, there have been cases reported of
people experiencing the Capgras delusion with their pets, or with inanimate objects
(Islam, et al 2015.), where motivational explanations seem far less plausible. The size
of the gap that needs to be closed by the second factor is evidently highly variable, as
is the force of the motivational component. But this does not show that motivational
factors are not playing a role in some cases of Capgras, it just shows that the role
played may be greater or lesser (or perhaps nil) depending on the case.
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